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On October 22, 1929, a headline in the New York Times read: “Fisher says prices
of stocks are low.” Two days later, the stock market crashed. Fisher based his projection
on strong earnings reports, fewer industrial disputes, and evidence of high investment in
R&D and other intangible capital. But, because the market fell dramatically, many analysts
concluded that he had been wrong in his assessment that stocks were undervalued in October
1929.
There have been many attempts since to determine if the rise in stock prices prior to
the crash in 1929 was in fact an inﬂated speculation, a “bubble.” The same basic methodology
has been applied, namely, to estimate deviations between market values and the present value
of expected future dividends. Many ﬁnd a bubble. Many do not. The results are inconclusive
because it is hard to estimate market participants’ expectations and the rates at which they
discount the future.1
In this paper, we take a diﬀerent approach to the question of whether or not stocks
were overvalued. Instead of using data on dividends, we use data on productive capital
stocks and tax rates to estimate the fundamental value of all U.S. corporations. By this, we
mean the value of productive assets in the corporate sector. Our conservative estimate of
the fundamental value of these corporations before the crash — assuming as low a value for
intangible capital as observations allow — is 20 times after-tax corporate earnings, which for
1929 is 1.8 times GNP.2
Estimates of the actual 1929 market value, which are based on samples of publicly
traded stocks, are all below 19 times after-tax corporate earnings at the peak in 1929. Thus,
we ﬁnd that the evidence supports Fisher’s view that stock prices, even at their peak, were
low relative to fundamental values.
12. The Market Value of U.S. Corporations in 1929
We ﬁrst estimate the market value of U.S. corporations at the end of August in 1929.
By this, we mean the market capitalization. Data are available for representative subsets of
U.S. corporations. In this section, we use these data to produce a range of estimates for the
market value of all U.S. corporations.
In our view, the most reliable estimate available is a total value of U.S. corporations
of 1.54 times GNP, or 17.5 times after-tax corporate earnings. This estimate is based on a
detailed study of 135 industrial corporations done by Laurence Sloan and Associates (1936)
at the Standard Statistics Company, a company that later merged with Poor’s Publishing
to become Standard and Poor’s (S&P). The estimate we will use, however, is a total value
of 1.67 times GNP (or 19 times after-tax corporate earnings). This estimate is based on the
price-earnings ratio of the S&P composite stock index. Because we are evaluating Fisher’s
claim that the stock market prior to the crash of 1929 was undervalued, we want to use a
conservative (high) estimate of the actual market value of U.S. corporations in 1929.
During the Depression, Sloan (1936) conducted a detailed study of 135 leading in-
dustrial corporations. The companies in the study had complete ﬁnancial histories over the
1922—1933 period and, in the authors’ opinion, were representative of large companies in
business during this period. The study provides detailed income accounts and balance sheets
for the aggregate and speciﬁc details for major industries and major corporations.
At the peak of the stock market in late August/early September of 1929, the common
stocks of the companies in Sloan’s (1936) sample had a market value of $30.8 billion. For the
year 1929, the net proﬁts, after tax, available for the common stock were $1.76 billion.
If the companies in the Sloan (1936) study are truly representative of the U.S. economy,
then we can use the market value and after-tax proﬁts for these companies to get an estimate
2of the total value of all corporations. In particular, if we assume that the ratio of market value
to after-tax proﬁts (the “price-earnings ratio”) for the 135 companies is equal to the price-
earnings ratio for all companies, then an estimate for the market value of all companies is the
price-earnings ratio of the 135 companies multiplied by after-tax proﬁts for all companies.
In Figure 1, we plot the ratio of economy-wide after-tax corporate proﬁts to GNP.
These data are available in the Survey of Current Business National Income and Product
Accounts (NIPA) for 1929 and after (U.S. Commerce 1929—2000). Prior to 1929, we apply
the methodology of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) to construct our own measures
of after-tax corporate proﬁts. (See U.S. Commerce 1985 and our Data Appendix for details.)
T h er e s u l t sa r ei nT a b l e1.I n1929, the BEA reports after-tax proﬁts equal to 8.8 percent of
GNP. Using their methodology, we estimate that while 1929 proﬁts were high, this year was
not an outlier. After-tax proﬁts in all years from 1925 through 1929 were high by postwar
standards.
If we multiply the price-earnings estimate of Sloan (1936), which is equal to 17.5, by
1929 total NIPA earnings, we get an estimate for the market value of all corporations in late
August/early September of 1929 of 1.54 times GNP (= 30.8/1.76 × 8.8).
We can use the same procedure with companies in the S&P indices. In Table 2, we
provide a list of the 50 companies in the S&P industrial index, the 20 companies in the S&P
index of railroads and the 20 companies in the S&P index of public utilities. The 90 are the
stocks in their composite index. Along with names, we report on the market capitalization
of each company at the end of August 1929 and the net earnings for the year 1929. The
market capitalization is computed with data from the Center for Research on Security Prices
(CRSP). Net earnings is the after-tax proﬁts for common stockholders, which is the sum
of common stock dividends plus surplus. Earnings data are compiled by Moody’s Investor
Services (1930) and Poor’s Publishing Company (1930).
3For the 50 industrial companies in the S&P index, the ratio of the total market capi-
talization to net earnings is 18.4. Aggregate earnings and this price-earnings ratio imply an
estimate for the aggregate market capitalization of 1.62 times GNP. This is slightly higher
than Sloan’s (1936) estimate, which was based on a broader subset of industrial companies.
To compute an estimate of the total market capitalization using all 90 companies in the
S&P composite index, we ﬁrst construct weights on industrials, railroads, and public utilities
using the entire population of companies in the CRSP database for August 1929. We ﬁnd that
the market capitalization of railroads (SIC 4000) in the CRSP population is 12 percent of the
total. We ﬁnd that the market capitalization of public utilities, including electric, gas, and
sanitary services (SIC 4900), as well as communications (SIC 4800) and local and interurban
passenger transit (SIC 4100) accounts for 17 percent of the total market capitalization of the
CRSP population of companies. The remaining 71 percent is considered to be in industrials.
With weights of 45%, 23%, and 32% on industrials, railroads, and utilities, respectively, we
can match aggregate market capitalizations with the S&P subsample.
If we weight market capitalizations and net earnings for the three S&P categories and
then take the ratio, we have a price-earnings ratio of 19.3 Aggregate earnings and this price-
earnings ratio imply an estimate for the aggregate market capitalization of 1.67 times GNP,
which is close to that for industrials only.
We should note that an estimate of 19 for the price-earnings ratio is signiﬁcantly higher
than that reported by Fisher, who cites the Standard Statistics Company as the source for
his data. Chart 11 of Fisher (1930) shows monthly price-earnings ratios for 45 industrial
companies between 1928 and 1929. If we take a 12-month average ending in August 1929, we
ﬁnd the ratio to be 14.1. Unfortunately, there is some ambiguity as to whether these numbers
are averages of price-earnings ratios or ratios of market capitalization to total earnings.
But there is other evidence on the total market capitalization in 1929 that is consistent
4with Fisher’s estimates. The evidence is available from the major stock exchanges. First,
we can use data on the market capitalization of the 846 companies listed on the New York
Stock Exchange. In Figure 2, we plot monthly levels in billions of dollars over the 1925—1931
period. We also plot the end-of-year market value as a ratio of GNP. In August of 1929,
companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange had a market value of $89.7 billion — close
to the value of GNP for the year 1929, which was $104.5 billion.
In Figure 3, we show that the market value of NYSE companies was roughly 69 percent
of the total value of all domestic corporations during the entire post-World War II period.
Here, we plot the market value of all domestic corporations in the United States relative to
U . S .G N Pa sr e p o r t e di nt h eFlow of Funds Accounts for the United States (Federal Reserve
Board 1945—2000). The Federal Reserve’s measure includes the total value of equity of all
publicly traded and closely held domestic corporations plus the value of their net debt (debt
liabilities less debt assets). Prior to 1974 net debt is a small share of the total value. In 1929,
net debt is actually slightly negative according to the aggregate balance sheet ﬁgures reported
in the Statistics of Income (U.S. Treasury 1913—1997); corporations were net creditors.4
Although the Flow of Funds data are available only after 1945, it is clear from Figure
3 that the market value of NYSE companies as a fraction of the market value of all U.S. com-
panies has been remarkably constant. The total market value of all domestic corporations
is about 1.45 times the market value of NYSE companies. Notice that these values are very
close for the entire post-World War II period — not only on average but at peaks and troughs
too. If we assume that the ratio is roughly 1.45 in the pre-World War II period as well, we
can use the NYSE values to get an estimate for the total value of U.S. corporations at the
peak in 1929. (See Figure 2.) This yields an estimate of $130 billion for August 1929, or 1.24
times 1929 GNP. If we assume that aggregate earnings are 8.8 percent of GNP, this implies
a price-earnings ratio of 14.1.T h i si st h es a m ea sF i s h e r ’ se s t i m a t e .
5Furthermore, Fisher’s estimate and the estimate based on NYSE and Flow of Funds
data are very close to that found by Jovanovic and Rousseau (2001). Jovanovic and Rousseau
use data from all of the major and minor exchanges, such as the NYSE, the regional exchanges,
and the over-the-counter market. They compute estimates of the market value of all domestic
corporations comparable to estimates of the Flow of Funds after 1945. (See their appendix
for details.) Their data are annual, so we took their end-of-year estimates and inﬂated them
to get an estimate of the market capitalization at the peak in 1929. Doing this, we ﬁnd a
market capitalization equal to 1.25 times GNP, which is almost equal to the estimate of 1.24
found by using a multiple of the NYSE.
In Table 3, we summarize the ﬁndings of this section. In each row of the table, we list
the source and coverage of the data, the information available — either the market values or
the price-earnings ratios — and our estimate of the total market value of all U.S. companies
relative to GNP. As we noted earlier, the estimate we believe to be the most reliable is Sloan’s
(1936), which implies a total market value of 1.54 times GNP. But this estimate lies between
the higher estimates based on S&P companies and the lower estimates of Fisher (1930),
Jovanovic and Rousseau (2001), and that based on the NYSE and Flow of Funds data.
To be conservative in assessing Fisher’s thesis, we will use the estimate of 19t i m e s
earnings when we compare the actual market capitalization to our estimate of the fundamental
value of the corporate sector.
3. The Fundamental Value of U.S. Corporations in 1929
We turn now to our estimation of the fundamental value of U.S. corporations. By this,
we mean the value of the underlying productive assets — both tangible and intangible — of
the corporate sector. In this section, we construct lower bound estimates of the fundamental
value of U.S. corporations in August of 1929. Each estimate is conditional on a real interest
6rate. In the subsequent section, we show that for all real interest rates that are not grossly
inconsistent with observations, the fundamental value exceeds the market value.
As we show in McGrattan and Prescott (2001), in an environment with stable tax
policy, the market value of a corporation along a balanced growth path should be equal to
V =( 1 − τpers)(K
0




T is the end-of-period resource cost of tangible capital, K0
I is the end-of-period
resource cost of intangible capital, τpers is the tax rate on personal income including stock
dividends, and τcorp is the tax rate on corporate proﬁts.
In the literature concerned with stock market bubbles, the standard formula used for
V is the present discounted value of expected future stock dividends rather than (1). In
theory, both can be used. The advantage of (1) is that it requires no assumptions about
market participants’ expectations. Instead, we need measures of marginal tax rates and the
resource cost of capital.
A. Marginal Tax Rates
In Table 3, we report marginal tax rates on corporate proﬁts and dividends. The tax
rate on proﬁts is the ratio of the NIPA proﬁts tax liability to the before-tax proﬁts from Table
1. The tax rate on dividends is a weighted average surtax rate on net income.5 The weights
used in averaging across net income classes are fractions of dividend income for each class.
Both tax rates shown in Table 3 stay roughly constant over the 1925—1929 period. The
tax rate on corporate proﬁts was on average 14.6 percent, and the tax rate on dividends was
roughly 10.3 percent. The fact that they are stable over time is important for our analysis
since we are computing steady state values.
7B. Tangible Capital
We now estimate the fundamental value of tangible capital using data from the Survey
of Current Business (U.S. Commerce 1929—2000) and the Statistics of Income (U.S. Treasury
1913—1997).
In Figure 4, we plot the resource cost of end-of-period tangible capital in the corporate
sector, namely, K0
T, relative to GNP. These data are constructed by the BEA and reported
in the Survey of Current Business. We plot the data with and without inventories. Prior
to 1947, inventories are not reported by the BEA so we instead use the value of inventories
from balance sheets on corporate tax forms. This is available between 1926 and 1977 from
the Statistics of Income.
Between 1926 and 1929, the resource cost of total measured, tangible capital plus in-
ventories was 1.27 times GNP on average. This ratio changed little until the Great Depression
period. By postwar standards, 1.27 times GNP is high. But tax rates on capital were much
higher in later periods. Using the average tax rates in Table 4, we compute a fundamental
value of 1.14t i m e sG N P( =( 1−.103)×1.27) for tangible capital.
We have not included land in our measure of tangible capital because data are not
available on land values. For the postwar period, McGrattan and Prescott (2001)e s t i m a t e
land values to be around 3.3 or 3.4 percent of GNP. Because we are computing a conservative
(low) estimate for capital values, we will simply ignore land for our calculations here.
We have also left out any corporate foreign capital, which is not included in BEA
measures. But this capital is insigniﬁcant in 1929.
8C. Intangible Capital
An estimate of intangible capital, namely, K0
I, is needed to compute our total fun-
damental value, V ,u s i n g( 1). This is more diﬃcult than computing the cost of tangible
capital because intangible investment is not recorded by the BEA. For the purposes of this
paper, we want to construct a lower bound on K0
I. If the lower bound for our estimate of the
fundamental value is larger than the upper bound of estimates of the actual market value,
we will argue that Irving Fisher was right.
A relation between after-tax NIPA proﬁts and the corporate capital stocks that we
can use to infer K0
I is
Π = iKT +( i − g)(1 − τcorp)KI (2)
where Π is after-tax NIPA proﬁts, i is the real interest rate, and g is the growth rate of real
output. (See McGrattan and Prescott 2000, 2001.) Two assumptions are needed to derive
(2). First, we assume that the after-tax rate of return for tangible corporate capital is equal
to the rate of return for intangible corporate capital and all other types of capital. Otherwise,
ﬁrms would not be operating in the interest of their owners. Second, we assume that tax
policy is unchanging so that steady state analysis is appropriate.
To see why (2) holds, consider how the BEA computes NIPA corporate proﬁts. Sup-
pose that the true income from capital in the corporate sector is rTKT + rIKI,w h e r erT
and rI are rental rates for tangible capital and intangible capital, respectively. If we subtract
depreciation allowances for tangible capital, property taxes, and any expenses like R&D that
are related to intangible investment, we have the BEA measure of before-tax corporate prof-
its. It is this income that is subject to corporate proﬁts tax. Thus, the BEA measure of
9after-tax corporate proﬁts is
Π =( 1 − τcorp)[rTKT + rIKI − δTKT − τpropKT − XI]( 3 )
where δT is the depreciation rate of tangible capital, τprop is the property tax rate, and
XI = K0
I −(1−δI)KI is intangible investment. In McGrattan and Prescott (2001), we show
that the real return to tangible investment is (1−τcorp)(rT −δT −τprop), while the real return
to intangible investment is rI −δI. The return on intangible investment is not aﬀected by the
corporate tax rate because intangible investment can be expensed while tangible investment
must be capitalized. Equation (2) follows immediately from the fact that both of these returns
are equal to i, the real interest rate.
If we divide both sides of (2) by GNP, we have a formula that we can use to estimate
intangible capital given observations on after-tax corporate proﬁts (Figure 1), the resource
cost of tangible capital (Figure 4), and the corporate tax rate (Table 4). This formula is
given by
.088 = 1.27i +[ ( 1 − .146)KI/GNP](i − g)( 4 )
for some ﬁxed ratio KI/GNP. Suppose, for example, that the growth rate of real GNP is 3.5
percent and the real interest rate is 5.6 percent. Then our estimate of intangible capital for
1929 — given observations on corporate proﬁts, the corporate tax rate, and tangible capital —
is 1 times GNP. Similarly, if the real growth rate is 3 percent and the real interest rate is 5.4
percent, then our estimate for intangible capital is again 1 times GNP.
We have observations on real GNP growth from Romer (1989). Romer’s estimates
imply that real GNP grew 3.64 percent per year between 1925 and 1929. Thus, we have
g =0 .0364.
The more diﬃcult measurement issue is i, the real interest rate. In McGrattan and
10Prescott (2000, 2001) we used data on noncorporate income and noncorporate capital from
the Survey of Current Business to construct estimates of i during the post-World War II
period, assuming that rates of return were not diﬀerent across the corporate and noncorporate
sectors. Unfortunately, we do not have any pre-crash data to perform this estimation.
T os e eh o wt h er e a li n t e r e s tr a t ea ﬀects the value of intangible capital and, therefore,
the fundamental value of corporate capital, consider Table 5. Table 5 shows how the funda-
mental value of U.S. corporations, V , changes as we change our estimate of the real interest
rate. Because we want a conservative estimate for the value V ,w ec o n s i d e rar a n g eo fh i g h
real interest rates, namely, 5 to 7 percent, and therefore low values for intangible capital. Real
interest rates around 4 percent are consistent with estimates in the postwar period. Rates
above 5 percent are high by postwar standards.
The fundamental value is the sum of the value of tangible capital, which is equal to
1.14, and the value of intangible capital, which varies with the real interest rate. For example,
a real interest rate of 5 percent implies a ratio of intangible capital to GNP (K0
I/GNP) equal
to 2.1 times GNP. This is the resource cost of intangible capital. With a personal tax rate
of 10.3 percent and a corporate tax rate of 14.6 percent, the fundamental value of intangible
capital is 1.61 times GNP. If we add this to the value of tangible capital (1.14), then the
estimate for the total fundamental value of corporate capital is 2.75 times GNP — much
higher than the market value of 1.67 times GNP.
As is clear from Table 5, the critical rate of interest is 6 percent. For real rates below 6
percent, the fundamental value of corporate capital is above 1.67 times GNP, and the market
is undervalued. At real rates of 6 percent and above, the fundamental value is below the
actual market value, and the market is overvalued.
To justify the DeLong and Shleifer (1991) and the Rappaport and White (1993) claim
that the stock market was signiﬁcantly overvalued in August 1929 — say, by as much as 30
11percent — we would have to have the real interest rate in excess of 6.5 percent. Our theory
says that for this overvaluation to be consistent with the facts on corporate proﬁts, capital
stocks, and tax rates, it must be the case that the value of intangible capital was very low
by postwar standards, roughly 0.18t i m e sG N P ,a n dt h a treal interest rates were very high
by postwar standards, in excess of 6.5 percent. This leads us to the evidence on the real rate
of interest.
4 .T h eR e a lR a t eo fI n t e r e s t
In this section, we determine an upper bound for the real interest rate using two meth-
ods. First, we use market interest rates from the 1925—1929 period to estimate real interest
rates in this period of a stable price level. Second, we use microeconomic and macroeconomic
observations along with estimates of preference parameters to bound real interest rates. Both
methods lead us to the conclusion that the real interest rate in August 1929 is below 6 per-
cent. This implies that the fundamental value of U.S. corporations exceeds the value of those
corporations’ market equity.
A. Market Interest Rates
The relevant market interest rates were not high in 1929. It is true, as Rappaport and
White (1993) have pointed out, that rates on brokerage loans were high in the period before
the stock market crash of 1929. However, the high brokerage rates are easily explained in
light of Federal Reserve policy.
In Figure 5, we plot rates for 90-day brokers’ time loans along with other key short-
term market interest rates. It is clear from the ﬁgure that brokers’ loan rates were relatively
high in 1928 and 1929. During 1928, the Federal Reserve adopted a tighter monetary stance
because “intense activity of the securities markets and the unprecedented rise of security
12prices gave unmistakable evidence of an absorption of the country’s credit in speculative
security operations to an alarming extent” (Federal Reserve Board 1929, pp. 1-2). In the
report, the Board notes that the measures taken in 1928 to stem growth in “speculation”
by selling open-market investments and by raising discount rates “had not proven adequate”
(Federal Reserve Board 1929, p. 2).
In February 1929, a letter was sent by the Board of Governors to regional Federal
Reserve banks stating that “a member bank is not within its reasonable claims for rediscount
facilities at its Federal reserve bank when it borrows either for the purpose of making specula-
tive loans or for the purpose of maintaining speculative loans” (Federal Reserve Board 1929,
p. 3). The Fed was concerned that credit would not be available for nonﬁnancial business
needs. Immediately following this action, loan rates rose dramatically.
Thus, the rise in brokers’ loan rates and very short-term rates was the direct eﬀect
of Federal Reserve policy and does not indicate that the stock market was overvalued or
that lenders perceived a bubble in the stock market as Rappaport and White (1993) have
argued.6 Since the Federal Reserve was following an explicit policy of constraining credit to
investors in the stock market that they viewed as “speculators,” it is not hard to rationalize
temporarily high brokers’ rates that exceed the return on productive assets.
If we consider other assets, we ﬁnd rates below 6 percent during the period from 1925
through 1929, even when we take into account the small decline in the price level. In Figure 5,
we plot commercial paper rates and short-term bond yields. In Figure 6, we plot intermediate-
and long-term bond yields. All are in nominal terms. For real rates we need to correct for
expected inﬂation. According to Romer’s (1989) estimates, prices over this period were very
stable. The United States was on a gold standard, and, given no trend in the relative price
of gold, expectations of inﬂation should have been very near zero. Romer’s implicit GNP
price deﬂator (with 1982=100) was 14.77 in 1925 and 14.60 in 1929. This implies an annual
13inﬂation rate slightly below zero at −.29 percent. If we use realized inﬂation as a proxy for
expected inﬂation, we have to adjust the rates in Figures 5 and 6 only slightly higher to get
real rates.
As the ﬁgures show, rates on U.S. Treasury securities at all maturities were in the
range of 4 percent and were not as aﬀected by Federal Reserve policy as the brokerage loan
rates. Commercial paper rates were in the range of 4 to 4.5 percent until the Federal Reserve
increased discount rates signiﬁcantly. At the peak of the market, these interest rates reached a
little over 6 percent. But, as with brokerage loan rates, these rates were high only temporarily.
Since we are interested in rates for productive assets in the corporate sector, a more
relevant market rate to consider is the corporate bond yield. Average nominal corporate bond
yields were roughly constant over the entire 1925—1930 period, at a little over 5 percent. If we
take into account inﬂation, the average yields were closer to 5.5 and at most 5.75 percent for
a very short period. According to Banking and Monetary Statistics (Federal Reserve Board
1943), the basic nominal yields of corporate bonds at a maturity of two years is around 5
percent for 1929. For longer-term maturities, the yields fall oﬀ to 4.4 percent. In the very
short term they are 5.6 percent.
If we use the maximum corporate yield of 5.75 percent as an upper bound on the real
interest rate, we estimate a resource cost of intangible capital equal to 0.83 times GNP. If we
account for taxes, this implies a fundamental value of intangible capital equal to 0.64 times
GNP. Adding this to the value of tangible capital implies a total value of 1.78 times GNP,
which is equal to 20 times corporate earnings.
B. Macro and Micro Evidence
There is strong indirect evidence that supports our view that the real interest rate was
below 6 percent in 1929. In this section, we show that if preferences are stable over time,
14estimates of preference parameters — based on both macro and micro evidence — can be used
to put a bound on the real interest rate.
We assume that households maximize discounted expected utility with the per-period
utility function given by U(c,l)=c1−σv(l)/(1−σ)a n dt h ed i s c o u n tf a c t o rg i v e nb yβ.H e r e ,
we are assuming that c is consumption and l is leisure. We choose these preferences because
they are consistent with observations on growth. (See Lucas 1990.)
We ﬁrst show that high values of σ and β are needed to account for a high real
interest rate in 1929. Then, we report on estimates of σ b a s e do nb o t hm a c r o e c o n o m i cd a t a
and microeconomic data — all of which are too low to justify a high real rate of interest.
Our preferences imply the following relationship between the real interest rate and the
real growth rate of per capita income if l is constant, as it nearly was:




where γ is equal to the growth rate of real GNP less the growth rate of the population. This
relation is derived by setting the interest rate equal to the intertemporal marginal rate of
substitution.
In the postwar period, real interest rates have been around 4 percent with growth in
per-capita consumption around 2 percent. Pairs of σ and β consistent with these facts must
satisfy 1.04 = (1.02)σ/β.
Now consider the 1925—1929 period. Real GNP growth between 1925 and 1929 av-
eraged 3.64 percent per year, while population growth averaged 1.26 percent. If prefer-
ences are stable, an estimate of the real interest rate is (1.0238)σ/β, which is equal to
(1.0238/1.02)σ × 1.04. If preferences are logarithmic so that σ = 1, the implied real inter-
est rate is 4.4 percent and the implied fundamental value of U.S. corporations is signiﬁcantly
15higher than the market value. For estimates of the 1929 real interest rate as high as 6 percent,
the point at which the pre-crash stock market was correctly valued, a risk aversion parameter
of σ > 5a n dad i s c o u n tf a c t o ro fβ > 1.062 are needed.
Estimates of risk aversion based on aggregate consumption and hours data are closer
to 1 than to 5. For example, McGrattan’s (1994) estimate for σ is 1.06 (Table 1, p. 587). High
values of risk aversion imply too little variation in key aggregate variables. Furthermore, if the
utility function is not separable in consumption and leisure, high values of risk aversion imply
relative variabilities of consumption and hours worked that are inconsistent with observations.
Estimates of risk aversion based on micro data also fall below 5. Browning, Hansen,
and Heckman (1999) report estimates from a variety of studies of food and nondurables
consumption that are in the range of .64 to 4 (Table 3.1, p. 609). Attanasio and Weber
(1995) consider micro data on nondurables consumption and get an estimate of 1.78 (Table
6, p. 1150). Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993) study consumption in an Indian village and ﬁnd
the estimate of risk aversion to be close to logarithmic at 0.964 (Table 2, p. 235).
A high value for σ also has implications for the diﬀerence in behavior of rapidly growing
and slower-growing economies. Examples of rapidly growing economies are Japan, Germany,
a n dF r a n c ei nt h e1960s or Korea and Taiwan in the 1965—1995 period. Examples of slower-
growing economies are the United States and United Kingdom in the post-Korean war period
and Japan, Germany, and France after 1975. If σ were large, returns on capital would be very
diﬀerent across these countries and time periods. Returns would be very high in countries
experiencing growth miracles, and given that capital shares are roughly equal across countries
and time, the capital-output ratio would be very low. But we do not see suﬃciently large
diﬀerences in returns and capital-output ratios for σ to be much above 1.
In summary, we ﬁnd no evidence of a high value for the real rate of interest — either
from observations on market rates in 1929 or from postwar micro and macro data. And, as
16ar e s u l t ,w eﬁnd no evidence of an overvalued stock market in 1929. Our calculations lead
us to the opposite view — that it was undervalued. Thus, we agree with Irving Fisher’s view
that stock prices in October of 1929 were low.
We should note that at each step in our estimation, we tried to err on the conservative
side. Our upper bound for the actual market valuation is 19 times corporate earnings, or 1.67
times GNP. Our lower bound for the fundamental valuation is 20 times corporate earnings,
or 1.78 times GNP. A fundamental valuation any lower is not justiﬁed by observations on
proﬁts, capital stocks, tax rates, growth rates, and interest rates.
5. Conclusions
In February 1930, Irving Fisher published The Stock Market Crash — and After.I nt h i s
book, he explained why he believed stock prices in the fall of 1929 were too low. Galbraith
(1954, p. 146), like many economic historians after him, viewed the crash as clear evidence
that Fisher was wrong. According to Galbraith (1954), Fisher’s book attracted little attention
because, as he put it, “one trouble with being wrong is that it robs the prophet of his audience
when he most needs it to explain why.”
This interpretation of events, however, incorrectly presumes that markets can be over-
valued but not undervalued. In fact, many who have studied the stock market in the 1920s
view the possible scenarios as twofold. The view is either (i) asset prices were too high rel-
ative to fundamentals or (ii) asset prices were justiﬁed vis-a-vis fundamentals. Few studies
have tried to argue for or against Fisher’s thesis that the stock market was undervalued.
In this paper, we examined the crash of 1929 with the aid of historical data and modern
theory. We ﬁnd that a conservative estimate for the market value of U.S. corporations is no
greater than 19 times corporate earnings (or 1.67 times GNP). We ﬁnd that a conservative
estimate for the fundamental value of U.S. corporations is no smaller than 20 times corporate
17earnings (or 1.78 times GNP). This comparison suggests that Irving Fisher was right to say
that stock prices were low in 1929, even at their peak.
The year 1929 is similar in many ways to the year 2001. Empiricists look at past data,
take averages, and state that things should remain as they were. (See, for example, Campbell
and Shiller 2001.) Then, as now, empiricists claim that stock prices are too high because
price-earnings ratios are above their historical averages. What we do instead is ask what level
of the stock market is justiﬁed.
18Data Appendix
In this appendix, we describe sources for the data used in the ﬁgures and tables.
1. Figure 1
(a) After-tax corporate proﬁts, prior to 1929:T a b l e1.
(b) After-tax corporate proﬁts, 1929 and later: www.bea.doc.gov/dn1.htm,
NIPA Table 1.14.
(c) GNP, prior to 1929:R o m e r( 1989), Table 2.
(d) GNP, 1929 and later: www.bea.doc.gov/dn1.htm, NIPA Table 1.9. Also used
for Figures 2, 3, and 4.
2. Figure 2
(a) Market Value of all listed NYSE Companies: Survey of Current Business,
Annual Supplements, various issues starting in 1932 (U.S. Commerce 1929—2000).
Also used for Figure 3 and Table 3.
3. Figure 3
(a) Market Value of all U.S. Corporations: Flow of Funds Accounts of the United
States (Federal Reserve Board 1945—2000). Add market value of domestic corpo-
rations in Table L213 to the sum of net debt (= total liabilities − total ﬁnancial
assets + corporate equities held directly or in mutual funds) from Tables L102,
L109, L114, L115, L118, L124, L126, L127, L130.
4. Figure 4
(a) Domestic tangible corporate capital: www.bea.doc.gov/dn1.htm, Fixed As-
sets Tables 7 and 9.
(b) Inventories: balance sheet reported in Statistics of Income, Corporation Income
Tax Returns, various issues (U.S. Treasury 1913—1997).
195. Figure 5
(a) Short-term Interest rates: Federal Reserve Board (1943), Table 115: Federal
Reserve Bank Discount Rates on Eligible Paper; Table 120: Short-term Open-
Market Rates in New York City; Table 122: Yields on short-term U.S. government
securities; Table 125: Bond Yields, by type of security.
6. Figure 6
(a) Corporate and Long-term U.S. Bond yields: Federal Reserve Board (1943),
Table 125.
(b) Intermediate-term U.S. Bond yields: Ibbotson Associates (2000), Table A-13.
7. Table 1
(a) NIPA Proﬁts after-tax, 1925—1928: all original data sources listed in U.S. Com-
merce (1985, Table 3). Some data are missing because they are not in the public
domain. Any missing ﬁgures appear in bold and are estimated to be proportional
to “Total receipts less total deductions” with the factor of proportionality equal
to the 1929 ratio.
8. Table 2
(a) Company list for S&P: Standard and Poor’s (1990, p. 115).
(b) Market Values for S&P: CRSP monthly stock database.
(c) Earnings for S&P: Moody’s Investor Services (1930) and Poor’s Publishing Com-
pany (1930).
9. Table 3
(a) Number of listed NYSE Companies: New York Stock Exchange (1960, His-
torical section).
(b) Market Value of 135 Industrials:S l o a n( 1936, p. 5).
(c) Company list, Market Values, Earnings for S&P:S e eT a b l e2 .
20(d) Price-Earnings of 48 Industrials:F i s h e r( 1930, Chart 11,p .8 6 ) .
(e) Market Value, All corporations: Jovanovic and Rousseau (2001), www.econ.
nyu.edu/user/jovanovi.
10. Table 4
(a) Tax rate on proﬁts: ratio of ‘Proﬁts tax liability, NIPA’ to ‘Proﬁts before taxes,
NIPA’ in Table 1.
(b) Tax rate on dividends: weighted sum of surtax rate on net income across net
income classes where the weights are dividend income for the class divided by total
dividend income.
11. Other Data cited in Text
(a) Population: www.census.gov/population/estimates/nation/popclockest.txt, Ta-
ble 16 of Population and Housing Unit Counts, CPH-2-1.i nCensus of Population
and Housing (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1990).
(b) GNP deﬂator:R o m e r( 1989), Table 2.
21Notes
1See, for example, Hamilton and Whiteman 1985 and Flood and Hodrick 1990. The
same critique can be applied to DeLong and Shleifer 1991, who argue that the high premia
paid for closed-end funds in 1929 was “excessive optimism.” It is diﬃcult to determine
whether investors were irrational or had very favorable expectations about the specialized
skills of the fund managers.
2For an estimate of 20, we need to assume that real interest rates were high and market
participants were quite risk averse. If we use more reasonable (lower) values for the real
interest rate and the level of risk aversion, we get fundamental values of U.S. corporations
higher than 20 times earnings.
3Prices fell roughly 30 percent between the end of August and the end of December. If
we multiply our estimate of the price-earnings ratio for the end of August by 0.7, we ﬁnd 13.3.
This is equal to the ratio of the end-of-year market capitalization to 1929 earnings reported
in the S&P Security Price Index Record (Standard and Poor’s 1990).
4Thus, any measure that we can get of the value of corporate equity in 1929 would
overstate the total value of the corporations, equity plus debt.
5The normal tax was not assessed on dividend income.
6Furthermore, it is not clear what connection there is between broker loans and the
value of the stock market. Rappaport and White (1993), for example, establish no such
connection.
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1Table 1. Relation of Corporate Profits and Taxes in NIPA and IRS
1925 1926 1927 1928 1929
Total receipts less total deductions, IRS 9.3 9.5 8.7 10.7 11.9
Plus: Adjustment for misreporting on income tax returns .5 .6 .5 .5 .7
Posttabulation amendments and revisions .1 .1 .1 .1 .1
Income of organizations not ﬁling corporation income .0 .0 .0 .0 .1
Depletion on domestic minerals .5 .6 .5 .5 .6
Adjustment to depreciate expenditures for mining exploration .1 .1 .1 .1 .1
State and local corporate proﬁt s t a x a c c r u a l s . 1. 1. 1 . 1 . 1
Bad debt adjustment .7 .7 .8 .8 .9
Net income received from equities in foreign corporations .2 .2 .2 .2 .2
Less: Tax-return measures of:
Gains, net of losses, from sale of property .5 .6 .5 .6 .7
Dividends received from domestic corporations 1.2 1.5 1.7 1.9 2.6
Income on equities in foreign corporations and branches .3 .3 .3 .4 .4
Costs of trading or issuing corporate securities .2 .2 .2 .3 .3
Equals: Proﬁts before taxes, NIPA 9.3 9.3 8.3 9.9 10.6
Federal income and excess proﬁts taxes, IRS 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.2
Plus: Posttabulation amendments and revisions .1 .1 .1 .1 .1
Amounts paid to U.S. Treasury by Federal Reserve banks .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
State and local corporate proﬁt s t a x a c c r u a l s . 1. 1. 1 . 1 . 1
Less: U.S. tax credits claimed for foreign taxes paid .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
Equals: Proﬁts tax liability, NIPA 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.4
Proﬁts after tax, NIPA 7.9 7.9 7.0 8.5 9.2
Proﬁts after tax relative to GNP (%) 8.7 8.1 7.3 8.7 8.8Table 2. Market Value at Month-End August 1929 and Net Earnings for 1929,
All Companies in S&P Composite Index
Market Value Net Earnings Price-earnings
Companies (millions) (millions) Ratio
50 Industrials
General Motors 3,132.0 236.5 13.2
General Electric 2,852.0 77.3 36.9
U.S. Steel 2,086.1 172.4 12.1
Standard Oil of New Jersey 1,753.1 120.9 14.5
Union Carbide & Carbon 1,114.1 35.4 31.4
Anaconda Copper 1,060.3 69.1 15.3
Woolworth (F.W.) 967.7 35.7 27.1
Standard Oil of California 963.4 46.6 20.7
Allied Chemical & Dye 762.3 27.4 27.8
Sears, Roebuck 754.8 30.1 25.1
Texas Company 685.7 48.3 14.2
Radio Corp. 647.5 11.5 56.4
Reynolds Tobacco 603.5 32.2 18.7
International Nickel 598.9 20.2 29.7
International Harvester 590.2 31.3 18.8
Eastman Kodak 483.9 21.6 22.4
American Radiator & Standard Sanitary 478.6 19.4 24.6
Standard Brands 476.3 17.3 27.5
American Can 440.4 19.8 22.2
Kresge (S.S.) 438.7 14.8 29.6
National Biscuit 436.0 19.7 22.1
Kennecott Copper 418.9 52.1 8.0
American Tobacco 394.3 27.0 14.6
Burroughs Adding Machine 352.5 11.7 30.2
General Foods 340.5 19.4 17.5
Bethlehem Steel 331.5 35.2 9.4
United Fruit 314.3 17.8 17.7
Pullman, Inc. 290.3 17.7 16.4
Timken Roller Bearing 261.5 14.2 18.5
Chrysler Corp. 300.9 21.9 13.7
American Smelting & Reﬁning 226.9 18.3 12.4
Westinghouse Air Brake 203.8 8.8 23.1
Goodyear Tire & Rubber 204.5 13.1 15.7
National Cash Register 151.6 6.2 24.3
Paramount Publix 146.7 15.5 9.4
St. Joseph Lead 138.9 7.5 18.6
American Locomotive 94.2 4.2 22.7
Allis Chalmers 90.8 4.3 21.0
Stewart Warner 84.2 6.8 12.3
U.S. Rubber 75.3 −2.7 −27.8
International Paper 74.3 −4.3 −17.2
Briggs Manufacturing 73.6 2.4 30.3
Twentieth Century—Fox Film Corp. 65.0 8.4 7.7
American Sugar Reﬁning 35.3 3.5 10.1
Abitibi Paper 27.5 1.9 14.1
Endicott Johnson 26.6 2.0 13.0
Armour and Co. 13.5 0.8 16.5
Cuban American Sugar 12.8 1.1 12.0
American Woolen 6.6 −4.2 −1.6
International Mercantile Marine 3.0 2.4 1.2
Total, 50 Industrials 26,085.5 1,420.8 18.4Table 2 (cont.)
Market Value Net Earnings Price-earnings
Companies (millions) (millions) Ratio
20 Railroads
Pennsylvania R.R. 1253.0 101.4 12.4
New York Central 1187.3 78.1 15.2
Canadian Paciﬁc 772.2 36.8 21.0
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe 717.2 54.8 13.1
Union Paciﬁc 655.8 45.3 14.5
Southern Paciﬁc 572.6 34.4 16.7
Chesapeake & Ohio 409.4 32.2 12.7
Baltimore & Ohio 348.0 26.4 13.2
Norfolk & Western 332.2 40.9 8.1
Great Northern 311.4 25.7 12.1
Delaware, Lackawanna & Western 276.2 13.3 20.7
Northern Paciﬁc 275.9 21.8 12.7
Southern Railway 197.6 15.1 13.1
Illinois Central 193.0 12.4 15.6
Reading Co. 185.7 18.3 10.1
Louisville & Nashville 176.7 13.7 12.9
Atlantic Coast Line 161.0 19.9 8.1
Chicago & North Western 158.9 14.0 11.3
Lehigh Valley 112.5 7.4 15.3
New York, Chicago & St. Louis 64.8 5.2 12.4
Total, 20 Railroads 8,361.2 617.0 13.6
20 Public Utilities
Consolidated Edison of New York 1887.0 32.1 58.7
United Gas Improvement 1098.0 27.6 39.7
North American Co. 942.4 27.0 34.9
Columbia Gas system 850.9 26.4 32.2
International Telephone & Telegraph 685.6 17.7 38.7
Public Service of New Jersey 532.0 22.1 24.1
American Power & Light 351.9 3.3 105.4
Detroit Edison 348.1 13.1 26.5
Paciﬁc Gas & Electric 283.1 10.9 26.0
American Water Works & Electric 281.6 6.6 42.5
Standard Power & Light 245.6 7.5 32.9
Western Union Telegraph 233.4 17.5 13.4
Peoples Gas of Chicago 209.4 6.3 33.3
Southern California Edison 202.3 7.7 26.1
Paciﬁc Telephone & Telegraph 191.5 10.7 17.9
National Power & Light 171.5 11.8 14.5
Brooklyn Union Gas 125.5 5.6 22.6
Brooklyn-Manhattan Transit 45.8 5.0 9.1
Twin City Rapid Transit 9.0 1.0 8.6
Interborough Rapid Transit 7.4 3.1 2.4
Total, 20 Public Utilities 8,702.1 263.1 33.1
Weighted Total, 90 Composite 16,403.8 863.6 19.0Table 3. Estimates of Market Value of All U.S. Corporations on August 30, 1929
Based on Information for Subsets of Corporations
Data Company Market Price/ Estimated Total
Source† Coverage Value Earnings Market Value/
($ billion) GNP
Sloan & Associates 1936 135 Industrials 30.8 17.5 1.54
CRSP & Moody’s Industrial Manual 50 S&P industrials 26.2 18.4 1.62
CRSP & Moody’s Industrial Manual 90 S&P composite 43.3 19.0 1.67
Irving Fisher 1930 45 Industrials 14.1 1.24
NYSE & Flow of Funds Accounts 846 listed on NYSE 89.7 14.1 1.24
Jovanovic and Rousseau 2001 All corporations 130.6‡ 1.25‡
† CRSP = Center for Research on Security Prices and NYSE = New York Stock Exchange








Average 14.6 10.3Table 5. Estimates of Intangible Capital and the Fundamental Value of














† Assuming a market value of 1.67 times GNP.